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Goldberg: The Death of the Common Law

BENJAMIN CARDOZO AND THE DEATH OF THE
COMMON LAW
John C. P. Goldberg*
INTRODUCTION
Although a member of the Supreme Court at the time,
Benjamin Cardozo did not participate in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.1 He was dying. It is a mere fortuity that Cardozo’s death
coincided with the death of the general common law.2 Yet it has since
proved to be something more—or so this essay will argue. It is in part
because our highest court took itself out of the business of making law
in contract, property, tort, and certain other subject areas that
Cardozo’s beloved common law has fallen on hard times, and that even
state-court judges have increasingly lost their feel for how to reason
about it. Today, there is no member of a state judiciary who rivals
Cardozo in stature. Mainly this is a testament to his extraordinary gifts.
But it also reflects the waning of the common law in the United States,
and a concomitant loss of the sense of what it means to be a great
common-law judge.
I
Oral argument before the Supreme Court in Erie took place
on January 31, 1938.3 Justice Stanley Reed, newly confirmed, was
welcomed to the junior justice’s seat at one end of the bench. The seat

*Eli

Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks for helpful comments to Samuel
Bray, Don Herzog, Andrew Kaufman, Mark Tushnet, and Ben Zipursky. Remaining errors are
mine.
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (recognizing the authority of the federal courts in
diversity-jurisdiction cases to identify and apply general common law).
3 Erie R. Co., 304 U.S. at 64.
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next to his was empty.4 It belonged to Justice Cardozo. Cardozo had
recently suffered a heart attack and stroke from which he would not
recover.5 At about the time the Court issued its Erie decision, he was
being returned by train to his home state.6 Put up at a friend’s home
just north of his New York City birthplace, he died weeks later.7
We will never be sure what Cardozo would have done in Erie
had he participated. But it seems probable that he would have joined
the majority for whom Brandeis wrote, and not just because he was
among the Court’s “liberals.”8
To be sure, Cardozo had his issues with Brandeis. Both
regarded themselves as following in the footsteps of Holmes, but each
emphasized different aspects of the great man’s legacy. Whereas
Cardozo drew from The Common Law an appreciation of the
historically rooted complexity and richness of judge-made law,9
Brandeis saw himself as The Path of the Law’s new man: the “man of
statistics and master of economics.”10 As we learn from Professor
Kaufman’s endlessly informative biography, Cardozo regarded
Brandeis as too much a wonk and too ideological.11 Cardozo also
would have chafed at Brandeis’s overblown claim that Swift was to be
condemned for relying on the false jurisprudence of the brooding
omnipresence, whereas Erie’s holding was authentic to the true
jurisprudence of Austinian legal positivism.12
4 Irving Younger, Observation: What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1027
(1978).
5 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 566-67 (1998). This is an apt occasion on which to
acknowledge my great good fortune in having benefited for the last decade from the
generosity, wisdom, and support of my esteemed colleague Andy Kaufman, master of all
things Cardozoan.
6 Id. at 567.
7 Id. His body was buried in a Queens cemetery located about an hour’s drive west of Touro
Law Center. A half-hour further west stands the Long Island Railroad’s East New York
station, the site of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
8 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 499-506 (noting that Cardozo interpreted the federal
Constitution to leave legislatures with broad leeway in the domain of economic regulation).
9 OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
10 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
11 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 473, 477-78, 497.
12 I base this speculation in part on Cardozo’s opinion for the Court in Great Northern Ry.
v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). Sunburst sued for a partial refund of
charges paid to Great Northern, claiming the charges were based on a rate that had been
improperly set by a Montana commission. The Montana Supreme Court upheld Sunburst’s
challenge, but also held that the proper rate would apply only to future transactions. Sunburst
argued to the U.S. Supreme Court that the state court’s prospective application of its ruling
was a violation of its due process rights. Writing for a unanimous Court, Cardozo rejected this
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Still, it was not Cardozo’s habit to write separately. 13 There is
also evidence that he was not a fan of Swift’s notion that federal courts
were entitled to fashion general common law. Indeed, Irving Younger
tells us that it was Cardozo who, in the summer of 1937, granted Erie’s
request for a stay after the judgment for Tompkins had been affirmed
on appeal. That he did so may suggest that he wanted the Court to
have an opportunity to revisit Swift.14
In support of this hypothesis, Younger also noted a decision in
which Cardozo, writing for the Court, announced that it would refrain
from adopting a rule of general common law on the question of
whether an insurance policy had lapsed because of a missed premium
payment attributable to the insured’s incapacitation.15 Rather than
allowing the case to “‘be complicated by a consideration of [the
Court’s] power to pursue some other course,’” he opted for “‘a benign
and prudent comity,’” according to which the law of the state in which
the contract was formed would control.16
More fundamentally, Cardozo was in his heart of hearts a statecourt judge. Even after his elevation to the United States Supreme
Court, he maintained a New York state of mind.17 Here it is worth
recalling that, in the judicial opinion that put him on the map (written
while he was still sitting on the Court of Appeals by designation),
Cardozo had no compunction swatting aside a directly on-point
general common law ruling that had been issued a year earlier by the
Second Circuit. Writing for a 5-1 court in MacPherson v. Buick,18
he declared the old privity rule dead, holding instead that, under New
York law, automobile manufacturers owe it to users of their cars to

argument, observing that the U.S. Constitution is “silent” on questions of “juristic
philosophy,” and that state courts are at liberty to adopt different understandings of the nature
of law and the judicial process. Id. at 364-66.
13 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 166.
14 Younger, supra note 4, at 1023-24.
15 Id. (discussing Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335 (1934)).
16 Id. (quoting Johnson, 293 U.S. at 339). Johnson was a unanimous decision and followed,
among others, another unanimous decision rendered the previous term in which the Court
stated in dictum that it was prepared to refrain from exercising its power to fashion general
law in the face of conflicting state court decisions. Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 290 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1933). Given that the Justices who later dissented in Erie signed off
on both Johnson and Trainor, it is difficult to draw inferences about Cardozo’s precise views
on Swift merely from his having authored Johnson.
17 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 472.
18 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). Chief Judge Bartlett dissented; Judge Pound did not vote.
Id. at 1057.
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take care that their cars not cause injury.19 Yet in Cadillac Motor Car
Co. v. Johnson,20 the Second Circuit—relying heavily on New York
precedents—had ruled oppositely on precisely this question. Indeed,
the federal court had gone so far as to pronounce itself unpersuaded by
the contrary interpretation of those precedents that had been provided
by New York’s intermediate appellate court when deciding the initial
appeal of the MacPherson case.21 One suspects that Cardozo took
some satisfaction in demonstrating to the Second Circuit that his
Appellate Division brethren had got the common law right (thank you
very much) and that Johnson had gotten it wrong.22
Relatedly, Cardozo may have worried that the Supreme Court
in Swift had assigned itself and the lower federal courts a task for which
they are not well-suited. On his understanding, judges charged with
developing the common law are meant to articulate rules of law
roughly in synch with prevailing norms and practices. 23 Yet, in the
Goodman case, to take one famous example, the Court, per Justice
Holmes, had announced (in dictum) a hard-and-fast general-law rule
according to which a vehicle driver with an obstructed view at a
railroad crossing would be denied recovery unless he exited his vehicle
to look for oncoming trains.24 Cardozo later criticized this aspect of
Goodman, emphasizing that it had gone astray by adopting a rule
without any experiential basis.25 The Supreme Court, he seemed to
imply, was particularly at risk of being ‘out of touch’ with local mores,
and hence poorly positioned to fashion common law.

19 Id. at 1053-54 (acknowledging Johnson as one of a few “decisions to the contrary in other
jurisdictions,” but dismissing it on the ground that it included a “vigorous dissent”).
20 221 F. 801 (2d Cir. 1915).
21 Id. at 804 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 145 N.Y.S. 462 (App. Div. 1914)).
22 Probably he was even more gratified when the Second Circuit, relying almost entirely on
his MacPherson opinion, reversed itself in the Johnson case, somehow concluding on a second
appeal that its initial 1915 no-duty ruling did not establish the law of the case. See Johnson v.
Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 F. 878 (2d Cir. 1919).
23 See generally John C. P. Goldberg, Note: Community and the Common Law Judge:
Reconstructing Cardozo’s Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324 (1990).
24 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
25 Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (emphasizing the “need for caution in
framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law,” especially “when there is no
background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. They are then, not the
natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and
imposed from without.”).
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II
So the odds are that, if he had participated in Erie, Cardozo
would have signed on to the rejection of Swift. Assuming so, he and
his admirers perhaps have reason to be grateful that he was denied the
opportunity to do so. For otherwise he would have contributed to
developments that have left our courts and our law professoriate in a
place that he would not much have liked. If death is ever timely,
Cardozo’s was. It allowed his professional life to go better than it
would have otherwise.26
My point is not to suggest that Erie’s holding was or is
indefensible. Swift had created serious problems and it was reasonable
for the Court to take steps to address them. Still, it is important not to
lose sight of the fact that Erie has created problems of its own.
For example, insofar as it was meant to block sophisticated
corporate actors from repairing to the federal courts to protect their
interests against unfriendly state common law, Erie has arguably
exacerbated a problem that was on its way to being ameliorated by
other means.27 Certainly the phenomenon of repeat-player defendants
seeking relief in federal court from unfriendly state law has not
disappeared. Rather, it has persisted on different and arguably more
problematic terms. Mostly disabled from inviting federal judges to
make general common law, defendants instead argue that federal law
simply bars state courts from doing what they have been doing. And,
starting with New York Times v. Sullivan,28 the Supreme Court has
shown itself prepared to deem entire swaths of state tort law null and
void, often in the name of protecting business interests.29 Unlike the
26 See DON HERZOG, DEFAMING THE DEAD (2017) (arguing cogently for the claim that postmortem developments can affect whether a person’s life goes better or worse).
27 EDWARD A. P URCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 59-64, 217-30 (1992) (explaining that (1) Swift’s notion
of a general law enforceable by federal courts was most helpful to corporate defendants in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; (2) by the 1930s, its significance had already
begun to shrink; and (3) Erie was but one of several developments that rendered the federal
courts in the 1940s substantially less friendly to business interests).
28 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This is not to suggest that, if the general common law were alive
and well in 1964, the Court would have declined to declare unconstitutional state officials’ use
of civil defamation law as a thinly veiled seditious libel prosecution. In short, Sullivan cried
out for a constitutional ruling. Whether the Court would have felt the need to develop anything
like the elaborate doctrinal edifice that grew out of Sullivan is a more interesting question.
29 See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return
to the Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433 (2016) (analyzing central cases in the
Supreme Court’s modern defamation and preemption jurisprudence).
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old general-law decisions such as Goodman, these decisions are
binding on state courts. Thus has Erie substantially raised the stakes
for a certain kind of state-federal conflict, in the process further tilting,
rather than leveling, the litigation playing field. On the question of the
constitutionality of the administrative state, Cardozo was of course
opposed to the Four Horsemen. Even so, it is difficult to envision him
pleased to learn that, today, the duty of vigilance demanded of
automakers by MacPherson’s interpretation of New York common
law can, almost at the drop of a hat, be pared down by federal judges
keen to protect the prerogatives of the federal Department of
Transportation, and indifferent to the traditional floor-not-ceiling
relationship of regulatory law to tort law.30
At a broader level, Erie has helped to convert the Supreme
Court into an almost exclusively public-law court. The Justices now
and again address issues of federal common law, and they sometimes
attend to federal statutes that raise common-law questions.31 The vast
run of their cases, however, concern questions of constitutional
or administrative law, and questions about the regulatory state.
And, overwhelmingly (and not coincidentally), they approach these
questions from within a post-Legal Realist, instrumentalist framework.
It is not obvious that the change in case diet fomented by Erie
by itself rendered the Justices—and the federal courts as a whole—less
attuned to common law and common law reasoning.32 But the
cumulative effects of that change and related changes seem reasonably
clear. Over the course of the Twentieth Century, the U.S. Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts became the focal point of our legal
system. By the 1960s (and ever since), the ‘big’ issues—free speech,
30 Geier v American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (deeming the imposition
of tort liability on an automobile manufacturer to be an obstacle to the implementation of
federal regulations and therefore preempted, notwithstanding the presence of an express
savings clause in the statute authorizing the regulations).
31 Thus have Justice Ginsburg and Chief Justice Roberts had occasion to tangle over the
place of proximate cause in determining liability under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685 (2011).
32 Although the U.S. Supreme Court does not resolve questions of substantive state law,
diversity jurisdiction obviously provides lower federal courts with occasions on which to do
so, at least provisionally. Whether, to what extent, and why these courts have lost their ‘feel’
for common law and common-law reasoning is a question for another occasion. However,
given the centrality of the work of the Supreme Court to law professors and hence modern
legal education, it seems plausible to suppose that members of the federal bench, on average,
bring to bear public-law-heavy legal training and a public-law mindset that corresponds to a
certain lack of deftness when it comes to adjudicating questions arising under the law of
contract, tort, property, and the like.
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civil rights, privacy, federalism—have played out in those courts.
Meanwhile, the state courts, though at times still influential,33 have
faded in significance. One way to make this point is to pose a
challenge to the reader: If asked to nominate a candidate for the bestcrafted state high-court decision on a matter of common law issued
since the turn of the millennium, which decision would you choose?
I am not denigrating the talent or dedication of the state bench.
I am merely describing a situation that American law and American
lawyers now face. Starting sometime after World War II, the ‘action’
in American law has been in public law, and at the national level. The
most perceptive torts scholars of that time—including the ever-astute
William Prosser—saw the writing on the wall. Prosser understood
that, if tort law were to continue to be a high-status field within the
law, it needed to be re-imagined. Instead of being thought of as (oldfashioned, regressive, formalistic) private law, it had to be seen as law
that empowers courts to engage in “social engineering”—i.e., to make
law on important policy issues in a manner akin to legislatures and
agencies.34 This was very much an effort to salvage the prestige of a
body of state common law (not to mention the prestige of the scholars
who attend to it) for the age of federal and public law.
Ironically, the most influential common-law judge of the last
35 years has been an occupant of the federal bench, namely, Richard
Posner.35 Quite self-consciously, Posner has claimed for himself the
legacy of Cardozo and Holmes. Their greatness, he says, lay in their
early and clear-eyed recognition that legal doctrine is the jargon in
which judges dress up instrumentally driven policy analysis.
According to Posner, it was this precocious insight, along with their
literary gifts, that ensured their enduring significance and, by
implication, will ensure his.

33 For example, state courts played an important role in the development of the nowrecognized federal constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry. See, e.g., Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that the denial of marriage to
same-sex couples violates the equal protection guarantee of the Massachusetts Constitution).
34 WILLIAM L. P ROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 25 (1st ed. 1941).
35 On the adoption of Posner’s opinions in Contracts and Torts casebooks, see Lawrence
Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner on Contracts and Torts, CONCURRING OPINIONS, (July 1,
2008), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/07/cardozo_and_pos.html.
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Yet Posner misidentifies the secret to Holmes’s and Cardozo’s
success,36 not to mention his own.37 What made Cardozo a great judge
was his mastery of the common law: a mastery that consisted of
something more than literary talent. Posner’s judicial excellence is
made of the same stuff. He knows a lot of law, has an excellent feel
for which doctrines are implicated by which facts, and sees how the
law’s distinct parts hang together.38 His distinctiveness from his
predecessors is largely at the level of theoretical packaging. To engage
in some justified table turning, one might say that Posner has felt
compelled in this, our post-Realist age, to hide his common law light
under the bushel of law and economics.39
Anyone who examines Cardozo’s decisional corpus will be
struck by his opinions, with their distinctive sentence structures and
memorable epigrams. A closer reading, however, reveals something
deeper, namely, his remarkable feel for the subtleties of the common
law and their significance. This is a judge who really understood
contract, tort, agency, partnership, trusts, restitution, equity, and many
other topics for which students, professors and judges today have little
feel. This is a judge who saw himself enmeshed in multiple
overlapping webs of doctrine, and who saw his job as making sense of
them, not by reducing them down to a single idea, but by taking them
seriously on their own terms, understanding what they mean and don’t
mean, and grasping how they relate to one another to form a scheme
that aspires to coherence, and is reflective of “the traditions and
conscience of our people.”40
Only a judge who truly understands negligence law, tort law,
and tort law’s relation to other bodies of law, including criminal law,

36

On Posner’s misreadings of Holmes and Cardozo, see John C. P. Goldberg, Book Review:
The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1436-41 (1999) [hereinafter, Goldberg, Life of
the Law]; John C. P. Goldberg, Style and Skepticism in The Path of the Law, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 225, 226-40 (1997).
37 John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to
Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 583 (2013).
38 Which of course is not to say that all of his opinions are equally masterful. See id. at 58389. Even Cardozo had some off days.
39 Goldberg, Life of the Law, supra note 36, at 1439 (noting Posner’s embrace of Grant
Gilmore’s claim that Cardozo “hid his light under a bushel”—i.e., adjudicated by reasoning
instrumentally rather than doctrinally, yet dressed up his reasoning in the language of doctrine
to conform to conventional lawyerly sensibilities).
40 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
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could have written Palsgraf.41 Only a judge who fully grasps the
doctrine and spirit of contract law could have written Allegheny
College.42 And only a judge versed in law and equity could have
offered the eloquent dissent in People v. Westchester County National
Bank of Peekskill.43 That’s the case in which Judge William
Andrews—sometimes praised for being the anti-formalist, justiceseeking champion of the downtrodden Helen Palsgraf—struck down a
statute, overwhelmingly approved by referendum, that authorized New
York state to issue bonds to finance modest payments to residents who
had served in the U.S. military during World War I.44
Andrews held that the bond issue violated a state constitutional
ban on the use of governmental credit to extend gifts to individuals.45
Cardozo rejected this characterization, faulting Andrews for too hastily
concluding that the payments in question were ineligible to occupy the
legal space between a payment in satisfaction of a legal debt, on the
one hand, and the mere conferral of a gift out of gratitude, on the
other.46 This ‘middle’ option—the one Cardozo believed to be
applicable to the case—was a payment based on an obligation that
sounded in equity. Here is how Cardozo described the situation
(I quote at length to remind us of his methods):
Great achievement and great sacrifice have been
meagerly rewarded. The perils of battle, the hardships
of camp and trench, may be poorly paid at any price;
few will assert that they are recompensed at the rate of
$1 a day. Even for those who did not reach the firing
line, there were the pangs of separation from home
and kindred, the anxieties and the strain of a new
and hazardous adventure. Legislature and people,

41 For a careful explication of this decision, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive
Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757 (2012).
42 Allegheny College v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y.
1927). For a careful explication of this decision, see Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College
Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149
(2005).
43 132 N.E. 241 (N.Y. 1921).
44 Id. at 247.
45 Id. at 245 (payments from the state could be deemed in satisfaction of an equitable
obligation only where “some direct benefit was received by the state as a state or some direct
injury [was] suffered by the claimant under circumstances where in fairness the state might be
asked to respond …”) (emphasis in original).
46 Id. at 248 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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beneficiaries of this devotion, have heard the call of a
moral duty to mitigate the disparity between suffering
and requital. But the catalogue of suffering does not end
with pain of mind and body. There was money loss as
well, or so at least a Legislature, looking at average
conditions, might not unreasonably believe. . . . We take
judicial notice of these things. We take judicial notice,
too, that since the beginnings of our history a sense of
the moral obligation to give aid to the returning soldier
has been felt and acted on by government. U. S. v. Hall,
98 U. S. 343, 346, 25 L. Ed. 180. The call of these and
kindred equities has been heard and answered in the
past. Are the equities so feeble, is their summons so
plainly an illusion, that we may answer them no more?
....
We err when we envisage the soldier’s relation to the
government in the category of contract. Contract in the
true sense there is none, but service conscripted by the
sovereign, and, even though not conscripted, rewarded
at its will. That is why payment of the wage does not
always satisfy the conscience that there has been
payment of the debt. The Constitution does not silence
these mutterings of spiritual disquiet when sacrifice
unevenly distributed oppresses those who profit by it
with the sense of a burden undischarged. Our ruling
in Matter of Borup, 182 N. Y. 222, 74 N. E. 838, 108
Am. St. Rep. 796, was founded in that truth. We held
that it was in the power of the Legislature by a
retroactive statute to assume liability to a landowner
injured by a change of grade, though at the time of the
change the impairment of value was damage without
wrong. Under the law before the statute, the loss was
one of the incidents of life in organized society. It was
part of the price which the citizen must pay for the
benefits of government. We held that the Legislature
might readjust the incidence of the burden, might
establish a more equitable distribution between the
individual and the public, through the voluntary
acceptance of liability for a loss which was without a
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remedy when suffered. I cannot yield to an appraisal of
values that would find the basis of an equity there, and
a mere cobweb, an illusion, here. In neither case is there
legal liability unless the Legislature assumes one. In
each there is an unequal pressure of the burdens and the
power of government upon one man and upon others.
The readjustment of these burdens along the lines of
equality and equity is a legitimate function of the state
as long as justice to its citizens remains its chief
concern.47
This is vintage Cardozo. Consider how much ground is covered
in these few sentences. There is an appeal to precedent and tradition.
There is a view of the deference owed by a state’s courts to its
legislature. There is careful attention to the distinct domains of law
and equity. And none of this can be dismissed as Cardozo dressing up
his ‘raw’ political preferences in fancy language: thanks to Professor
Kaufman’s dogged research, we know that Cardozo told Felix
Frankfurter that he (Cardozo) personally opposed the bond issue.48
Note too that equity, as Cardozo employs it, is not an idea of
unconstrained discretion to do justice. Rather, it is equity rooted in
and constrained by the methods of tradition and sociology. Andrews’
majority opinion treated the envisioned payments as, at best, a
unilateral expression of gratitude to the state’s veterans. Now pause
for a moment and bring yourself to the present. Think of the sentiment
that is everyday expressed when civilians encounter a soldier. “Thank
you for your service,” we say. This sort of routine, ritual interaction is
the stuff of equity as Cardozo understood it. Of course within this
sentiment there is an expression of gratitude. But there is more than
that. There is an acknowledgment of sacrifices and losses, and of
benefits conferred—of debts that are owed and that may never be
repaid. To be sure, a court in the exercise of its equitable powers—
even though they include the authority to recognize certain claims that
lack a grounding in legal right, and to issue forms of relief beyond
those available at law—could not legitimately order a sovereign state
to compensate one of its veterans merely because the veteran sought
such an order. A legislature, however, has broader powers. New
York’s regarded the bond issue as the acknowledgment of an equitable
47
48

Id. at 249-50 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 340.
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debt, and the payments made under it as a partial fulfillment of an
authentic equitable obligation.49 And it was reasonable to do so. As
always, for Cardozo, reasonableness was determined not by high moral
theory, but by precedent, by tradition, and by how people in the world
actually act, talk, and feel. There is a broadly shared understanding of
military service—an understanding that is entirely practical, not
ethereal. It is this understanding that defeats the suggestion that the
payments in question could only be construed as mere handouts.
III
Perhaps a virtuoso of Cardozo’s caliber finds his way to the
bench only once in a generation. My worry is that, thanks in part to
Erie, the future ‘hit’ rate will be even lower. The passing of Swift v.
Tyson was hardly an occasion for wailing and the gnashing of teeth.
But the Erie doctrine should still be recognized for what it is: a
tributary feeding a stream feeding a river that is steadily bearing us
away from common law and common-law method.
Then again, legal history is anything but linear. Perhaps, just
ahead, a bend in the river awaits us. Perhaps the next Cardozo is right
now sitting in one of our classrooms. I look forward to reading her
opinions.
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